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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals of Utah has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (19 88) and Rule 35, Utah
Rules of Appellate Practice.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1) Did Brown & Root fail to raise the issue* of War drop's
eligibility

for temporary

total disability compensation

in the

proceedings before the Industrial Commission, thereby waiving that
issue for purposes of appeal.
2)

Has

the

Court

of

Appeals'

decision1

in

this

matter

misapprehended the nature of the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the
Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), thereby misconstruing
the amendments as "procedural" rather than "substantive".
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both issues identified above are questions of general law.
The Court of Appeals will

therefore review the issue under

"correction of error" standard of review.

a

Morton Int'l v. State

Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The statutes determinative of the issues presented by this
petition
subsequently

for

review

amended,

99 (1988), repealed

are:

Utah

Code

Ann.

§35-1-99

(1986),

Laws 19 88, Ch. 116, §9; Utah Code Ann. §35-1and recodified,

Laws 1990, ch. 69, §13; Utah

Code Ann. §35-1-98 (1994 Replacement); and Utah Code Ann. §68-31

The Court of Appeals' initial decision in this matter is
set forth in full as Exhibit A, attached hereto.

(1993 Replacement).

Each of the foregoing statutes

are set forth

in full in Appendix B, attached hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Brown & Root and its workers' compensation
insurance
"Brown

carrier, Highland

&

Root")

Insurance

petitioned

(referred

for. review

of

to jointly
the

as

Industrial

Commission's award of workers' compensation benefits to Wardrop.
On October 19, 1995, the Court issued its decision holding the
Industrial Commission had erred in refusing to apply
amendments

to

§35-1-99

of

the

Utah

Workers

the 1988

Compensation

Act

retroactively to Waldrop's claim.
On receipt of the Court's decision, the Industrial Commission
sought and received permission from the Court to file this petition
for rehearing.
Facts--Wardrop's

Accident

and

Injury:

Brown

& Root

has

accepted the findings of fact set forth in the ALJ's decision and
adopted by the Industrial Commission.2 (Record at page 66)

The

following facts, as set forth in the ALJ's decision, are relevant
to this petition for rehearing.
During

April

1987, Waldrop

working for Brown & Root. (R.54)

injured

his

right

knee

while

Wardrop notified Brown & Root of

his injury and obtained medical care from several physicians over
a period of several months. (R. 55-57.)
2

Dr. Janeway was the last

The decisions of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission
are set forth in full as Exhibits C and D, attached.
2

such physician to treat Wardrop, seeing him for the last time on
March 5, 1988. (R. 57)
After his last examination of Wardrop, Dr. Janeway advised
Brown

& Root

that

Wardrop

had

suffered

an

anterior

cruciate

ligament injury which would cause continuing knee instability.

It

was Dr. Janeway's opinion- that Wardrop would require a brace or
reconstructive surgery at some time in the future. (R.58)
Brown & Root accepted liability for Wardrop's injury and paid
his medical expenses incurred through 1988, as well as temporary
total disability compensation. (R. 55; petitioner's brief, p.4)
Between 19 88 and 1992, Wardrop continued to have pain in his
right knee. (R. 58)

Then, on January 27, 1992, his right knee gave

way, causing him to fall.

(R. 63)

Subsequent tests disclosed

damage to the right knee's anterior cruciate ligament, requiring
corrective surgery. (R.58)
During early spring, 1992, Wardrop notified Brown & Root of
his need for

surgery.

(R. 58)

Brown & Root denied Wardrop's

request, prompting Wardrop to file an application for hearing with
the Industrial Commission during May 1993. (R. 1)
Course of Proceedings Below:

After an evidentiary hearing,

the ALJ awarded medical expenses and temporary total disability
compensation to Wardrop. (Exhibit C, attached.)
Brown & Root filed a motion for review with the Industrial
Commission.

Brown & Root raised four points: 1) That Wardrop's

3

current injury was not related to his prior industrial accident; 2)
That Wardrop's claim presented significant medical issues requiring
referral to a medical panel; 3) That the ALJ erred in refusing to
allow Brown & Root to cross .examine Wardrop regarding his criminal
record; and 4) That the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the Act
snouia

De

applied

retroactively

to

bar

Wardrop's

claim

for

additional medical expenses.3
The Industrial
raised

by

Brown

Commission denied each of

& Root's motion

for

review

the
and

four

points

affirmed

the

decision of the ALJ. (Exhibit D, attached)
Brown & Root then petitioned for appellate review of the
Industrial Commission's decision, again alleging that the 1988
amendments

to

§35-1-99

of

the Act barred Wardrop's

claim

for

medical expenses and that the medical aspects of Wardrop's claim
should be referred to a medical panel.

In addition, Brown & Root

raised for the first time the contention that Wardrop was not
entitled

to

additional

temporary

disability

compensation.

(Petitioner's brief, page 12, 13.)
Brown & Root filed its brief with the Court on February 8,
1995.

It did not serve a copy of its brief on the Industrial

Commission.
time for

On March 26, 1995, after the Industrial Commission's

filing a responsive brief had expired, Brown

& Root

forwarded a photocopy of its brief to the Industrial Commission.
3

A full and complete copy of Brown & Root's motion for
review is set forth in Exhibit E, attached.
4

Thereafter, neither Brown & Root nor Wardrop served any additional
briefs, motions or other documents on the Industrial Commission.
However, it appears the Industrial Commission has received the
Court's interim orders and instructions entered in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By

failing

to

raise

Wardrop's

right

to

temporary

total

disability

compensation as an issue in proceedings before

Industrial

Commission, Brown

& Root has waived

the

that

issue

on

Utah

Workers'

appeal.
The

1988

amendments

to

§35-1-99

of

the

Compensation Act are substantive in nature.

The amendments should

not be applied retroactively to defeat Wardrop's claim for future
medical expenses.
The proper application of the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 is
an

issue of public

individual claim.

importance

that goes

far beyond

Wardrop's

The Court deserves the benefit of adequate

briefing and argument on this issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: HAVING FAILED OT RAISE WARDROP'S TEMPORARY
TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION AS AN ISSUE BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT CANNOT RAISE THE
ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
In

this

case,

Brown

& Root's

motion

for

Industrial Commission raised four specific issues.

review

to

the

The issue of

Wardrop's temporary total disability compensation was not among the
issues so raised.

Consequently, the Industrial Commission had no

opportunity to address that* issue.
5

Utah's appellate courts have consistently held that issues
that could have been raised before an administrative agency, but
were not, cannot later be raised for the first time on appeal.
Alvin G. Rhoades Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d
1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); Rekward v. Industrial Commission, 755 P.2d
166

(Utah App. 1988) .

The Court should therefore decline

to

consider on appeal Brown & Root's arguments regarding Wardrop's
claim to temporary total disability compensation.
POINT TWO: THE 1988 AMENDMENTS TO §35-1-99 OF THE ACT
ARE SUBSTANTIVE AND SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The fundamental issue in this proceeding is whether amendments
to

§35-1-99

of

the Act

can be

applied

retroactively

against

Wardrop.
Since at least 189 8, it has been the law in Utah that statutes
are given only prospective effect, absent some clear legislative
intent to the contrary:
Constitutions, as well as statutes, should operate
prospectively only, unless the words employed show a
clear intention that they should have a retrospective
effect. This rule of construction as to statutes should
always be adhered to, unless there be something on the
face of the statute putting it beyond doubt that the
legislature meant it to operate retrospectively.
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Sorv, 52 P. 382, 384
1998) .

Likewise,

specifically

Utah

provides:

Code

Ann.

"No part

of

§68-3-3
these

retroactive, unless expressly so declared."

6

(1993
revised

(Utah

Replacement)
statutes

is

Utah's
exceptions

appellate

courts

recognized

to the rule prohibiting

statutes.

Statutes

which

are

two

retroactive

either

purely

categories

of

application

of

procedural

or

explanatory of preexisting law may be given retroactive effect.
State, Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982) .
The foregoing rules are - applicable in workers' compensation
proceedings:
In workers' compensation cases, we generally apply
the law existing at the time of injury. . . . However,
there are exceptions to this rule. If amendments are
procedural and do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy
vested or contractual rights, the amended statute may be
applied retroactively. . . .
Furthermore, if the
amendments (are) remedial in nature, the amendments can
still be retroactively applied.
Wicat Systems v. Pellegrini, 771 P.2d 686, 687 (Utah App. 1989) .
Brown & Root does not contend that the 19 88 amendments to §351-99 of the Act are "remedial".

Consequently, the 1988 amendments

can have retroactive effect only if they are purely procedural.
Conversely, if the 1988 amendments are substantive,

they cannot be

applied to Wardrop's claim.
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act imposes an obligation upon
employers to pay the medical expenses of injured workers.
Code Ann. §35-1-81

(1994 Replacement).

Utah

Utah's appellate courts

have consistently held that the employer's obligation for medical
expenses is ongoing and indefinite:
. the law is firmly established that, once it is
determined that there was an industrial accident, there
is no limitation as to the time during which the medicals
must continue to be furnished.
7

Kennecott v. Industrial Commission, 597, P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1979),
citing

Kennecott v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102; see also U.S. Fid.

& Guar, v. Industrial Commission, 657 Utah 764, 766 (Utah 1983) .
In the case before the Court, Wardrop suffered his industrial
accident and injury in 1987.

He. gave timely notice of the injury

to Brown & Root as required by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99 (19 86) then
in effect.
Wardrop's

Brown & Root accepted liability for the injury and paid
medical

substantive
regardless

right
of

expenses.
to payment

when

such

Thus,
of

his

expenses

in

19 87,

Wardrop

future medical

were

incurred.

had

a

expenses,
The

only

limitations on his right to payment of future medical expenses were
that the medical treatment be causally related to his industrial
accident and reasonably necessary.
In 19 88, the Utah Legislature amended §35-1-99 of the Act to
impose a new condition to injured workers' right to payment of
future medical expenses:
(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an
employee's medical benefit entitlement, except with
respect to prosthetic devices, ceases if the employee
does not incur, and submit to his employer or insurance
carrier for payment, for a period of three consecutive
years medical expenses reasonably related to the
industrial accident.
The

199 8 amendment

changed

the

substance

of

an

injured

worker's right to medical benefits by removing that right in cases
where the worker's injury required treatment less frequently than
every

y/

three consecutive year".

Thus, the 1988 amendments to §35-

1-99 directly limited the substantive right to payment of future
8

medical expenses that injured workers had previously enjoyed.
Because

the

19 88

amendments

to

§35-1-99

of

the

Act

are

substantive, their retroactive application cannot be justified on
the grounds

they are

"procedural".

Furthermore,

there

is no

indication that the legislature intended retroactive application of
the.1988 amendments.
of

construction

Consequently, the Court should apply the rule

set

forth

in

Utah

Code

Ann.

§68-3-3

(1993

Replacement): "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
unless expressly so declared."
CONCLUSION
In this petition for rehearing, the Industrial Commission has
identified the misapprehensions of law and fact that may underlie
the Court's previous decision in this matter.

Because Brown & Root

did not raise the issue of Wardrop's temporary total disability
during

the

proceedings

before

the

Industrial

Commission,

the

Industrial Commission urges the Court to decline to address that
issue on appeal.

Because the 1988 amendments to §35-1-99 of the

Act are substantive, the Industrial Commission urges the Court to
affirm the Industrial Commission's determination that the 1988
amendments may not apply retroactively to Wardrop's claim arising
from his 1987 injury.
The issues presented by this case are of great significance to
all

the

participants

in

the

workers'

compensation

system.

Unfortunately, errors and oversights by all the parties prevented
the Court from receiving the benefit of appropriate briefing and'
9

argument.

The Industrial Commission respectfully requests that the

Court instruct the parties to submit additional briefs, then set
this matter for oral argument.
Dated this 20th day of November,.1995.

Alan Hennebold (4740)
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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EXHIBIT A:
INITIAL DECISION, UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BROWN & ROOT V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
CASE NO. 940652-CA; Filed October 19, 1995

1

i B— 3 — 8 - /
OCT 1 9 1995

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

COURT O F APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Brown & Root Industrial
Service and Highland
Insurance,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Petitioners,

Case No. 940652-CA

v.
Industrial Commission of Utah,
and David Wardrop,

F I L E D
( O c t o b e r 1 9 , 1995)

Respondents.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Stuart L. Poelman and Julianne P. Blanch, Salt Lake
City, for Petitioners
G. Scott Jensen, Ogden, for Respondent David Wardrop

Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings.
BENCH, Judge:
Brown & Root Industrial Service (Brown & Root) and its
insurer appeal the Industrial Commission's award of medical
expenses and temporary disability compensation to David Wardrop.
We reverse.
BACKGROUND
Wardrop was injured at a work site in April 1987 while
employed by Brown & Root. Wardrop visited several physicians,
underwent surgery, and received treatments for which Brown & Root
paid the medical bills. Wardrop's employment with Brown & Root
ended later in 1987. Wardrop submitted his last medical bill
related to this accident in 1988.
In 1992, Wardrop reinjured his knee in a nonindustrial slipand-fall accident. Wardrop sought coverage from Brown & Root for
surgery and rehabilitation, claiming that his 1992 injury was
causally related to his 1987 industrial accident. Brown & Root

EXHIBIT A, PAGE ONE

refused to cover Wardrop's injury and, in May 1993, Wardrop filed
a claim with the Industrial Commission.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that because
section 35-1-99 of the Utah Code was amended after Wardrop's
initial industrial injury, it could not be applied to bar
Wardrop's claim. The ALJ determined that Wardrop's 1992 injury
was a "natural consequence" of the 1987 industrial injury, and
ordered Brown & Root to pay workers' compensation benefits for
the 1992 injury. Brown & Root filed a motion for review with the
Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission denied Brown &
Root's motion for review, and affirmed the ALJ's Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
ANALYSIS
Brown & Root claims that the Industrial Commission erred by
determining that the applicable statute in this case was the 1986
version of section 35-1-99, which was in effect at the time
Wardrop was initially injured.1 Whether to give retroactive
effect to an amended statute of limitations is a question of
general law when "the [commission's] experience or expertise is
not helpful in resolving the issue." Morton Int'l Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991). We therefore review
the Industrial Commission's determination under a correction of
error standard. See Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 853 n.2
(Utah 1992) (stating when "there is no explicit delegation of
discretion, and the issues are questions . . . on which the
Commission's experience and expertise will be of no real
assistance" then no deference given to commission).
The 1986 statute provided, in pertinent part, that "[i]f no
claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission
within three years after the date of the accident or the date of
the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation is
wholly barred." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (Supp. 1986). At that
time, the statutory term "compensation" did not include medical
expenses. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 597
P.2d 875, 877-78 (Utah 1979). Therefore, "the three year statute
of limitations set forth in section 35-1-99 did not bar the
recovery of medical expenses." Kennecott Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 740 P. 2d 305, 310 (Utah App. 1987) . Thus, according to
the Industrial Commission's conclusion, since medical expenses
1. Brown & Root also claims that the Industrial Commission erred
in not convening a medical panel to review the physicians'
conflicting medical opinions. In light of the disposition of
this case, we need not reach this issue.

940652-CA

EXHIBIT A, PAGE TWO
2

were not considered compensation under the 1986 statute in effect
at the time of Wardrop's initial claim, it followed that the
statute did not limit his claim against Brown & Root for medical
expenses under his 1993 claim. Consequently, the Industrial
Commission held that Brown & Root was liable for medical expenses
incurred by Wardrop after his nonindustrial injury.
In 1988, the legislature amended section 35-1-99 and
expressly expanded the statute to encompass medical expenses.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(2) (1988) stated in part, that "[i]n
nonpermanent total disability cases, an employees's medical
benefit entitlement . . . ceases if the employee does not incur,
and submit to his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for
a period of three consecutive years, medical expenses reasonably
related to the industrial accident."2 Brown & Root arguBs that
the 1988 amendment should be applied retroactively to bar
Wardrop's application for benefits. The Industrial Commission
held that the 1988 amendment could not apply to Wardrop's claim,
concluding that "it is well settled that the law in effect at the
time of the accident governs the substantive rights of the
parties."
Generally, an amendment to a statute will not be given
retroactive effect. However, statutes that affect procedural
rights rather than substantive rights are generally applied
retroactively. State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 475 (Utah App.
1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). Section 35-199(2) has been held to be a statute of limitations. See Avis v.
Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992), cert.
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Statutes of limitation are
generally considered to affect only procedural rights. Financial
Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree & Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah
App. 1994). Accordingly, the 1988 amendment bars Wardrop's claim
against Brown & Root for medical expenses.
Similarly, the statute of limitations in section 35-1-98(2)
bars Wardrop from claiming total temporary disability benefits.
It requires a claimant to file an application for a hearing "with
the commission within six years after the date of the
[industrial] accident." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-98(2) (1994).
Wardrop's industrial accident occurred in April, 1987, and he
filed his claim in May 1993, over six years after the accident.
Thus, his claim for temporary total disability benefits was
untimely filed.

2. Section 35-1-99 was repealed entirely in 1990 and its
relevant provisions were incorporated into Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-198(1) (1994) .

940652-CA

EXHIBIT A, PAGE

We therefore reverse the award of benefits-

f£U**&£('

Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

I DISSENT:

Gregorv^iCT Orme^ Presiding Judge

940652-CA

EXHIBIT A, PAGE

COVER SHEET
CASE TITLE:
Brown & Root Industrial Service
and Highland Insurance,
Petitioners,
v.
Case No. 940652-CA
Industrial Commission of Utah,
and David Wardrop,
Respondents.
October 19, 1995.

OPINION (For Official Publication).

Opinion of the Court by RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge; GREGORY K. ORME,
Presiding Judge, dissents; and JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge, concurs.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of October, 1995, a true and correct copy of the
attached OPINION was deposited in the United States mail to the parties listed below:
Stuart L. Poelman
Julianne P. Blanch
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys at Law for Petitioner
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
G. Scott Jensen
Fair, Kaufman, Sullivan, Gorman, Jensen
Medsker & Perkins
Attorney at Law for Respondent
Bamberger Square Building
205-26th Street #34
Ogden, UT 84401
Judicial 'Secretary
Original Proceeding in this Court
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EXHIBIT B:
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann, (1986) amended Laws 1988/ ch. 116,
§9:
When an employee claiming to have suffered an injury in the service
of his employer fails to give notice to his employer of the time
and place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature
of the accident and injury, within 48 hours, when possible, or
fails to report for medical treatment within that time, the
compensation provided for herein shall be reduced by 15%; provided,
that knowledge of the injury obtained from any source on the part
of the- employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman, or
other person" in authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the
injured sufficient to afford an opportunity to the employer to make
an investigation into the facts and to provide medical treatment is
equivalent to this notice; and no defect or inaccuracy in the
notice subjects the claimant to this reduction, if there was no
intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in making his
defense, and the employer was not, in fact, so misled or
prejudiced. If no notice of the accident and injury is given to
the employer within one year after the date of the accident, the
right to compensation is wholly barred.
If no claim for
compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three
years after the date of the accident or the date of the last
payment of compensation, the right to compensation is wholly
barred. However, the filing of a report or notice of accident or
injury with the Industrial Commission, the employer, or its
insurance carrier, together with the payment of any compensation
benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment by the employer or
an insurance carrier, tolls the period for filing the claim until
the employer or its carrier notifies the employee, in writing, of
its denial of liability or further liability for the industrial
accident or injury, with instructions upon the notification of
denial to the employee to contact the Industrial Commission for
further advice or assistance to preserve or protect the employee's
rights.
The claim for compensation in any event shall be filed
within 8 years after the date of the accident.
Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann. (1988) repealed
and recodified
Laws
1990, ch. 69, §13:
(1) If an employee claiming to have suffered an industrial accident
in the service of his employer fails to give written notice within
180 calendar days to his employer or the commission of the time and
place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature of
the accident and injury, the employee's claim for benefits under
this chapter is wholly barred. If, for any reason, an employee is
himself unable to provide this written notice, the employee's nextof-kin or attorney may file it within the required 180-day period.
Receipt of written notice is presumed if the employer complies with
the terms of Section 35-1-97 by filing with the commission an
accident report, or if the employer or its insurance carrier pays
disability or medical benefits to or on behalf of the injured
employee.
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Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Ann, (1988)

cont.

(2) In nonpermanent total disability cases, an employee's
medical benefit entitlement, except with respect to prosthetic
devices, ceases if the employee does not incur, and submit to his
employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of three
consecutive years medical expenses reasonably related to the
industr ial accident.
(3) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial
disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is
wholly barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the
Industrial Commission within six years after the date of the
accident.
(4) A claim for death benefits is wholly barred, unless an
application for hearing is filed within one year of the date of
death of the employee.
35-1-98. Claims and benefits (1994 Replacement)
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent
total disability cases an employee's medical benefit entitlement
ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably
related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to
his employer or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of
three consecutive years.
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, permanent partial
disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is
barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the
commission within six years after the date of the accident.
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application
for hearing is filed within one year of the date of death of the
employee.

68-3-3, Retroactive effect (1993 Replacement)
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive,
expressly so declared.
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EXHIBIT C:
DECISION OF THE ALJ

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 93-561

DAVID WARDROP,
Applicant,
VS.

BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
(Black, Nicols & Guiver =
Adjuster),
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
January 31, 1994 at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
Said
hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and was represented by G.
Scott Jensen, Attorney.
The defendants were represented by Stuart Poleman,
Attorney.

This case involves a claim for benefits associated with a
proposed surgery on the applicant's right knee. The applicant
claims that the cause of the need for the surgery is an April 23,
1987 industrial right knee injury.
The adjustor originally
accepted liability for the knee injury and paid medical expenses
and temporary total compensation (TTC) from July 14, 1987 through
July 27, 1987 while the applicant recovered from an arthroscopic
surgery on the right knee. Payment of medical expenses continued
through some time in 1988 and then no further medical expenses were
incurred until 1992. The adjustor declined to pay further expenses
in 1992 because: 1) the applicant went more .than 3 years without
incurring or submitting related medical expenses and per the
current reading of U.C.A. 35-1-98(1) this causes the applicant's
medical benefit entitlement to cease and 2) the applicant sustained
a subsequent non-industrial injury that caused aggravation to the
right knee and caused the need for the more recent recommendation
for surgery.
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The applicant's testimony was taken at the hearing and a
medical record exhibit (Exhibit D-l) was entered into evidence at
that time. Other exhibits entered into evidence at the hearing
include: Exhibit D-2 (the employer's first report of work injury)
and Exhibit D-3 (a written notarized statement apparently signed by
the applicant's prior employer in Colorado). At the close of the
hearing, counsel for the defendants indicated that he wanted to
submit an audio tape of the applicant's recorded statement taken by
the adjustor in June of 1987. Counsel for the applicant objected
to admitting the tape. The ALJ indicated that counsel for the
defendant should have a written transcript of the tape prepared
post-hearing and should provide the applicant and his attorney with
a copy of the transcript. After counsel for the applicant reviewed
the transcript, the ALJ determined that he would be allowed to
submit to the ALJ any objections he had to the admission of the
transcript and could request a second hearing for cross examination
of the adjustor who recorded the statement. On February 9, 1994,
counsel for the defendants wrote the ALJ and indicated that he had
decided not to request admission of the audio tape or a transcript
of the tape. As such, the ALJ wrote counsel for the applicant on
February 23, 1994 and indicated that she would consider the matter
ready for order as of the date that counsel for the defendants'
letter arrived at the Commission (February 9, 1994).

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant is a male who was 24 years old on the date of
injury, April 23, 1987, and who had no spouse at that time, but had
one minor child dependent upon him for support. The applicant was
working for Brown & Root Industrial Service (also listed as Brown
& Root Construction or Brown & Root USA) as a laborer on April 23,
1987 and had been so employed for 3 weeks on the date of injury.
The applicant was working 40 hours per week and was earning either
?5.50/hour or $5.63/hour at that time. The applicant testified
that on April 23, 1987, he was working on building a burn plant and
/as assigned to clean mud and water out of a pit so that a sump
Dump could be installed. The applicant explained that the laborers
/ere using 5-gallon buckets to transfer the mud and water up out of
-Jtie pit. The applicant estimated that the pit was 10 to 12 feet
leep and he indicated that he had to use a rope to get down into
•Jtie pit. At one point, £he applicant was climbing up out of the
>it using the rope, and he slipped and fell back into the pit,
.anding with his right,leg on top of an overturned 5-gallon bucket.
'he applicant stated that this fall jarred the knee and caused it
C\{\ 1
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to pop. He stated that it was painful for a while, but he managed
to complete his shift that day. The applicant recalls that he
reported the injury to his supervisor before leaving work and also
spoke to him on the phone after he got home.
The applicant continued to work, doing his normal duties
after the date of injury. Then, apparently on May 4, 1987, the
applicant was throwing a large box up into a dumpster and the right
knee "locked" on him.
Apparently, his supervisor took him to
Tanner Memorial Clinic, in Layton, Utah, on that day, Snd the
applicant was seen by Dr. P. Taylor, a family practitioner. Dr.
Taylor/s office note describes the original injury on April 23,
1987 and diagnoses a right knee strain. Dr. Taylor found no
specific point tenderness, but did note discomfort along the
medical collateral ligament. A knee X-ray was read as normal. Dr.
Taylor determined that the applicant could return to work right
away, with no running, jumping or heavy lifting. Once again, the
applicant returned to work, apparently for another 3 weeks, and
then he decided to to get a second opinion regarding his knee from
Dr. C. Bean, an orthopedist at the Tanner Memorial Clinic.
The applicant saw Dr. Bean on May 28, 1987 and his office
note of that date indicates that the applicant had persistent pain
and stiffness after the initial injury and had persistent medical
joint pain and repeated minor strains after the box throwing
incident. Dr. Bean/s diagnostic impression was: 1) torn medial
meniscus and 2) torn anterior cruciate, partial v. complete tear.
He recommended light duty and prescribed tolectin. He noted that
if there was no improvement within the next 6 weeks, he would
recommend arthroscopic surgery. The applicant testified at hearing
that when he requested light duty with Brown & Root, he was
terminated.
After seeing Dr. Bean, the applicant apparently contacted
the adjustor and he testified at hearing that the adjustor agreed
to send him to Dr. C. Gabbert, an orthopedic surgeon in Ogden,
Utah. Dr. Gabbert saw the applicant on July 1, 1987, and he noted
that the discomfort that the applicant had at that time was on the
medical aspect of the knee. He noted that the applicant had had 3
or 4 episodes of locking, where it was necessary to massage the
knee in order to get it to straighten out. He also noted that the
applicant had a feeling of instability in the knee and that it was
bothersome going up and down stairs. Dr. Gabbert diagnosed a
probable torn meniscus and he recommended arthroscopic surgery.
rxrv^^rtr
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The surgery Was performed at McKay Dee Hospital on July 14, 1987.
The operative report indicates that no lateral or medial meniscus
tears were found and that the anterior cruciate ligament was in
tact. The post-operative diagnosis was: no pathology found.
The applicant testified that he continued to have the
locking problems post-surgery and even fell down once when he tried
to stand up from a sitting position and the knee locked. He stated
that Dr. Gabbert did not prescribe any kind of exercises for the
knee and did not tell him to restrict his activities in any way.
Dr. Gabbert's July 23, 1987 office note indicates that the
applicant was progressing satisfactorily and that the applicant was
released to return to work on July 27, 1987. "However, when he saw
him again on August 19, 1987, he noted that the applicant was still
having some discomfort, especially when working with torque or when
he kneeled directly on the knee. Dr. Gabbert noted that the
applicant could walk without any noticeable problem, that he had no
swelling or ligamentous instability, that he had full range of
motion and that he had good quad function. At that point, his
office note indicates that he recommended isometric quad
strengthening for what he considered to be subjective knee
discomfort of uncertain etiology. On September 21, 1987, Dr.
Gabbert wrote the adjustor and indicated that he anticipated no
permanent impairment to the right knee.
Per the applicants testimony, he spoke with the adjustor
again in late September or early October of 1987. The applicant
testified that the adjustor allowed him to select another
specialist for consultation, as he was still having problems with
the right knee.
The applicant saw Dr. L. M. Janeway, an
orthopedist at Ogden Clinic on October 28, 1987. There is a
handwritten office note for that date and a Physician's Initial
Report of Work Injury form. The office note is mostly illegible,
out the form indicates that the applicant had mild joint effusion,
aild anterior cruciate ligament laxity and medial joint tenderness,
issociated with an April 1987 fall into a sump pump hole. The
liagnosis indicated on the form is: disruption of right knee
interior cruciate ligament. The form indicates that Dr. Janeway'
:elt that the knee required further evaluation and probable
surgery. Dr. Janeway's office note indicates that the applicant
lid not show up'for his next appointment on November 6, 1987. The
ipplicant testified at hearing that.Dr. Janeway told him he should
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just do exercises and that he might need surgery in the future. He
stated that Dr. Janeway told him that the knee would get worse, but
that he could hold off on the surgery, because the knee was not
that bad at that time.
It is unclear what the applicant did
between late October 1987 and March of 1988.
On March 5, 1988, Dr. Janeway saw the applicant again and
wrote the adjustor. In that letter, Dr. Janeway notes that the
applicant's right knee was still painful, especially with attempts
at increased activity.
He notes the applicant's symptoms to
include knee pain and thigh numbness with prolonged sitting and
occasional locking with increased pain going up and down stairs.
Dr. Janeway notes that, at that time, he prescribed feldene and
instructed the applicant to return to him in one week for further
evaluation. The letter to the adjustor notes that Dr. Janeway
believed that the applicant had an anterior cruciate ligament
injury which would continue to stretch and cause increased knee
instability. He notes that he suspected that the applicant would
need a brace and/or reconstructive surgery, because one year had
gone by since the date of injury and he did not believe that time
alone would return the applicant to normal knee function. Once
again, it is unclear what the applicant was doing at this
particular time, but as of June of 1988, he got a job in Ogden,
Utah at Goodyear, acting as the Assistant Manager there for about
one year.
Sometime in the latter half of 1989, the applicant moved to
Colorado and initially worked at Bailey Tire for an unspecified
period of time. He then got a job with Metric Automotive and
worked there until August of 1992. However, in January of 1992,
the applicant had an aggravating incident to his right knee. The
applicant testified that on January 27, 1992, he was getting out of
his car, in his inclining driveway, when his right foot slipped on
some ice on the ground and he fell to the ground. The applicant
stated that he feels that the right knee instability that he had
been having since 1987 contributed to the fall. He apparently went
to see Dr. P. Sillix, D.O., on the same day, and he completed a
form there which indicates that his injury was "slipped on ice
running." At hearing, the applicant tesified that he did sign the
form in the medical record exhibit and did complete the form. He
admits writing "slipped on ice" but he denies that he wrote
"running" on the form. The applicant testified that he never did
see Dr. Sillix, because he was called away to the hospital.
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The applicant testified that he called the adjustor some
time after his fall and told her that he had reinjured the knee.
He testified that the adjustor gave him permission to see Dr. D.
Mayer, a physician associated with Grand- Junction Orthopedic
Associates, in Grand Junction, Colorado. The applicant saw Dr.
Mayer on March 4, 1992. Dr. Mayer/s office note of that date
indicates that the applicant had been having persistent problems
with the right knee since the 1987 injury. He notes that the
applicant had persistent pain with any activity and that he fell
down with pain any time he did a pivotal shift. He noted that this
had occurred one week ago and that the applicant had s^n Dr.
Sillix as a result (perhaps meaning one month ago). Dr. Mayer
diagnosed an anterior cruciate insufficient right knee with
probable stretched out anterior cruciate ligament which was
essentially non-functional. He noted that he planned arthroscopic
surgery with a partial medial menisectomy and reconstruction of the
anterior cruciate ligament, if it was significiantly stretched out.
Despite these plans, he completed a "work capacity/disability
report" on March 5, 1992 and he found that the applicant could
return to work without restrictions at that time. The applicant
tesitified that when he notified the adjustor regarding Dr. Mayer's
recommendations, he was initially told that further details would
be necessary. However, he stated that he was later told that the
surgery would not be authorized. The applicant stated that he
could not afford the time off for the surgery at that time if he
could not get compensation (Dr. Mayer had told him that there would
be a year of rehabilitation after the surgery) and thus he decided
not to pursue the surgery.
The applicant continued to work at Metric Automotive until
August of 1992 and then he testified that he painted cars for the
owner of Metric Automotive through October of 1992. He stated that
he was on a vacation to Utah during November of 1992, and then
returned to Colorado and worked for Hot Automotive as a
mechanic/painter during December 1992. In January of 1993, he was
again in Utah for a vacation and he stated that he saw an attorney
regarding the knee surgery at that time. The applicant filed his
application for hearing in May of 1993 and in October of 1993 he
was seen by Dr. G. Zeluff, an orthopedist, at the request of the
adjustor. At that point, Dr. Zeluff had most of the applicant's
medical records for review, but did not have Dr. C. Bean's records.
On examination of the applicant, Dr. Zeluff noted that the
applicant definitely appeared to have an anterior cruciate ligament
insufficiency and some ^continuing damage.to the medical meniscus.
He noted that "this" -'could be synovial swelling in the medial
compartment of the knee. Dr. Zeluff noted that Dr. Bean's apparent
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findings conflicted with Dr. Gabbert's, in that Dr. Bean apparently
diagnosed an anterior cruciate problem shortly after the April 1987
industrial fall, while Dr. Gabbert found no problem with the
anterior cruciate on arthroscopy. Dr. Zeluff explains that an
anterior cruciate ligament can look normal on arthroscopic
examination when in fact it is unstable.
He concluded that,
without Dr. Bean's records, and relying on Dr. Gabbert7s findings,
he would have to say that the applicant had a normal anterior
cruciate ligament after the April 1987 fall, with the more recent
findings of insufficiency in that ligament being the result of one
of the later twisting injuries to the knee, like the fallron the
ice in January of 1992.
Dr. Zeluff was later supplied with the records of Dr. Bean.
He did an addendum report to clarify his conclusions after
reviewing the records. That clarification report is dated December
30, 1993. In that report, Dr. Zeluff notes that Dr. Bean felt
there was an anterior cruciate tear, OR partial tear, at the time
of his examination. Dr. Zeluff explains that partial tears are
very hard to diagnose from testing or arthroscopic surgery. Based
on this new information, Dr. Zeluff revised his conclusion to state
that he felt there was a strong possibility that there was a
partial tear to the anterior cruciate ligament in May of 1987, when
Dr. Bean examined the applicant. However, Dr. Zeluff's ultimate
conclusion was that the additional twisting injuries that the
applicant suffered after the April 1987 fall, especially the fall
on the ice in January of 1992, aggravated the tear and completed
it.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Three-Year Statute of Limitations;
The defendants' first defense is that the applicant's claim
for additional medical expenses related to the proposed surgery is
barred by the statutory provision specifying a three-year statute
of limitations for medical expenses. This three-year limitation
was first specified in U.C.A. 35-1-99(2) as it was amended in 1988.
That provision is now located in U.C.A. 35-1-98(1), as it was
amended in 1990, and reads in pertinent part as follows:
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an employee's medical benefit entitlement
ceases if the employee does not incur medical
expenses reasonably related to the industrial
accident and submit those expenses to his employer
or insurance carrier for payment, for a period of
three consecutive years.
The ALJ finds that if that statutory provision was in effect at the
date of the applicant's injury, it would probably bar the applicant
from any claim for additional expenses after 1991. However, that
provision was not in effect on April 23, 1987, having first become
effective in 1988. Applying the well established principal that it
is the law on the date of injury that applies', the ALJ finds that
the above-cited provision does not apply to the applicant's claim,
because it was passed and became effective after the applicant had
his April 23, 1987 industrial injury. The ALJ must therefore
dismiss the defendants' first defense.
Subsequent Accident Compensability:
The defendants argue that the cause of the most recent
recommendation for surgery is the January 27, 1992 non-industrial
fall and not the April 23, 1987 industrial accident (per Dr.
Zeluf f) . The applicant claims that the cause of the most recent
recommendation for surgery is the April 23, 1987 industrial
accident, as it was noted as early as March of 1988 that the
surgery would be needed eventually as treatment for the industrial
accident (per Dr. Janeway) . The conclusions of Dr. Zeluff and Dr.
Janeway could be seen as controverting opinions, warranting a
referral to a medical panel for addtional input. However, Dr.
Janeway is unaware of the January 27, 1992 accident and it is
unclear whether he would feel that this subsequent accident
aggravated the anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury. Therefore,
it is not clear that there is any controversy regarding whether an
aggravation occurred in January of 1992. This makes the need of
additional medical input less clear.
In addition, claifying
whether or not an aggravation did occur appears to be unnecessary.
This is true because the ALJ finds that, even presuming that the
1992 fall aggravated the injury caused by the April 1987 industrial
fall, the effects of that aggravation are compensable.
Professor Larson nas stated tne rule on compensability of
subsequent accidents to be as follows:
EXHIBIT C. PAGE FTOHT
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When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out
of and in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the
result of an independent intervening cause
attributable to the claimant's own intentional
conduct*
A* Larson, Workmen's Compensation, §13.00 (Desk Ed. 1988}. In
discussing complications that follow the initial or primary injury,
Larson cites a Utah case, Perchelli v, Utah State Indus, Comm'n,
475 P.2d 835 (Utah 1970), in which it was determined that a sneeze
following an industrial back injury (which sneeze caused the need
for surgery to the back) was compensable. Larson states:
The case should be no different if the triggering
epidsode is some nonemployment exertion like
raising a window or hanging up a suit, so long as
it is clear that the real operative factor is the
progression of the compensble injury, associated
with an exertion that in itself would not be
unreasonable in the circumstances.
A. Larson, supra, §13.11(a).
Larson also notes a category of
subsequent injuries that he refers to 11as "weakened member
contributing to later fall or other injury.
Id. §13.12. Larson
states:
Where the question of intervening cause has arisen
in the category of cases covered by this
subsection, it has usually been held that the
claimant's negligent act broke the chain of
causation. ... As to what constitutes negligence,
in these cases it often takes the form of rashly
undertaking a line of action with knowledge of the
risk created by the weakened member.
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In addition to the discussion by Larson regarding subsequent
accident compensability, there is just one Utah case that is
particularly on point. That case is Mountain States Casing v.
McKean, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) and involved a work injury causing
loss of sensation in the hand, which the injured worker later
burned severely, partially because the loss of sensation prevented
him from.feeling the burn. The Court in that case states:
A subseqent injury is compensable if it is found to*
be a natural result of a compensable primary*
injury. McKean is not required to show that his
original tragedy was the sole cause of a subsequent
injury, but only that the initial 'work-related
accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent
hand injury.
Although this seems to be more generous in finding compensability
than the Larson rule, the Court in McKean does go on to note that
the applicant's subsequent activity was not negligent or
intentional, so that it appears that the Court is adopting a rule
similar to what Larson notes as appropriate.
Applying the above-stated "rules" to the instant facts, it
would appear that if the applicant was merely getting out of the
car when his right leg gave way, partially due to the ice and
partially due to the longstanding effects of the 1987 injury to the
ACL, any resulting aggravation to the ACL caused by the fall that
followed would be compensable. This would be true, because getting
out of the car was not an unreasonable or negligent act, and
because the inital work related accident was a contributing cause
of the fall, that occurred after getting out of the car. On the
other hand, if the fall occurred because the applicant was running
on the ice, as is suggested by the form completed at Dr. Sillix's
office, the effects of the fall could be non-compensable. This is
because the fall might then be considered to be the result of an
intentional and negligent act, that was a rash undertaking
considering the fact that the applicant knew that the right leg
occasionally gave way or locked.
The ALJ finds that'the applicant was not running on the ice
when the fall occurred iri January of 1992 and was actually getting
out of the car when he/slipped on the ice and possibly aggravated
the ACL iniury that he; incurred as a result of the industrial fall
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at issue on April 23, 1987. The ALJ makes this conclusion because
the form from Dr. Sillix's office contains the only reference to
running on the ice that has been submitted and there is no other
confirmation that the applicant was running on the ice when he fell
in 1992. The applicant testified that he was getting out of the
car in his driveway when he fell on the ice and he denies that he
was running on the ice when the fall occurred. The defendants have
not argued strenuously that the fall occurred while the applicant
was running and have offered no evidence that would confirm that
the applicant was running when he fell.
In addition, the
defendants presented written argument regarding the compensability
of the fall in a post-hearing letter which is based on the
applicant falling after getting out of the car.
Because the ALJ finds that the applicant fell on January 27,
1992 after getting out of his car, partially as a result of ice on
the driveway and partially as a result of the effects of the April
23, 1987 injury to the ACL (causing locking and giving way of the
knee) , the ALJ finds that any aggravation to the right knee caused
by the January 1992 fall is compensable as a "natural consequence"
flowing from the April 23, 1987 fall. This conclusion is based
upon the discussion regarding subsequent injuries in Professor
Larson's treatise and the adoption of the Larson rule by the Utah
Supreme Court, as noted in the McKean case cited above. The ALJ
should point out that she makes no ruling regarding whether or not
an actual aggravation to the knee occurred on January 27, 1992.
The ALJ simply finds that even if one did occur, it does not break
the chain of causation between the April 23, 1987 fall and the
current recommendation for surgery. Dr. Janeway did note as early
as March of 1988 that the need for reconstructive surgery was
anticipated at that point and that the ACL would continue to
stretch with additional instability in the knee occurring simply as
a result of the passage of time.
Certainly, one legitimate
interpretation of the medical records in this case is that, per Dr.
Janeway's prediction, the ACL simply worsened with time and now
requires surgery. However, as noted above, even if a subsequent
aggravation (in January of 1992) is causing the need for the nowrecommended surgery, that aggravation is compensable.
Based on the foregoing conclusions, the defendants should
pay for the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that is
currently recommended and should pay the applicant temporary total
compensation (TTC) during his recovery from the surgery.
The
defendants should withhold 20% of the applicant's TTC for payment
to the applicant's attorney once the applicant has stabilized.
EXHIBIT C, PAGE ELEVEN
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ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver Adjuster), pay the applicant, David Wardrop, temporary total
compensation during the period of his medical instability following
the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will be performed
at a future date*
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver Adjustor), pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the
April 23, 1987 industrial accident, including those expenses
related to the reconstructive surgery to the right knee that will
be performed at a future date; said expenses to be paid in
accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the
Industrial Commission of Utah,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Brown & Root
Industrial Service/Highlands Insurance (Black, Nicols & Guiver Adjustor), pay G. Scott Jensen, attorney for the applicant,
attorney fees witheld from the applicant's temporary total
compensation to be paid in the future, in an amount consistent with
the Commission rule R568-1-7, for services rendered in this matter,
the same to be paid in a lump sum at the time that the applicant
stabilizes.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which, to file a written
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2) Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this Q day of March, 1994.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge

EXHIBIT D;
DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
DAVID WARDROP,
Applicant,

*
*
*

vs.

*

BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICE and HIGHLAND
INSURANCE,

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW
Case No. 93-0561

*

Defendants.

*
*

Brown & Root Industrial Service and its insurance carrier,
Highland Insurance (referred to jointly hereafter as "Brown &
Root") ask The Industrial Commission of Utah to review an
Administrative Law Judge's Order awarding medical expenses and
temporary total disability compensation to David Wardrop in
connection with anticipated surgery to Mr, Wardrop's right knee.
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this Motion For
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-182.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts the very thorough findings of fact set
forth in the ALJ's decision. Those facts are summarized below as
background for the Commission7s decision.
On April 23, 1987, in the cdurse of his employment by Brown &
Root, Mr. Wardrop fell and injured his rxght knee. Although his
knee hurt, he continued to work. Ten days later, again in the
course of employment at Brown & Root, his right knee "locked" on
him. He was first examined a Dr. Taylor and diagnosed with "knee
strain." Three weeks later, Dr. Bean, an orthopedist, diagnosed a
torn medial meniscus and damage to the anterior cruciate ligament.
Brown & Root authorized Dr. Gabbert to perform arthroscopic
surgery on Mr. Wardrop's knee. During the surgery, Dr. Gabbert
observed no tears in either the medial meniscus or anterior
cruciate ligament. During subsequent examinations, Dr. Gabbert
noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to experience subjective
discomfort in the knee, but suffered no objective problems.
In October 1987, Brown & Root authorized Dr. Janeway, also an
orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop. Dr. Janeway diagnosed Mr*
Wardrop as suffering from disruption of the anterior cruciate
ligament, associated with his work-related injury. Then, during
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March 1988, Dr. Janeway noted that Mr. Wardrop continued to suffer
pain in the knee, attributable to the damaged anterior cruciate
ligament. Dr. Janeway advised Brown & Root that a brace and/or
surgery would be required to correct the problem. Mr. Wardrop did
not pursue the matter further for the next several years.
On January 27, 1992, as he was stepping out of his car, Mr.
Wardrop's right foot slipped on ice, causing him to fall to the
ground. Brown and Root authorized an orthopedic examination by Dr.
Mayer, who diagnosed a probable stretched anterior cruciate
ligament and concluded that arthroscopic surgery was necessary.
Brown & Root declined liability for the anticipated surgery
and related period of temporary total disability. In response, Mr.
Wardrop filed an Application For Hearing. Brown and Root then
arranged for Dr. Zeluff, an orthopedist, to examine Mr. Wardrop.
Dr. Zeluff..-found "a strong possibility" that Mr. Wardrop had
suffered an injury to the anterior cruciate ligament of his right
knee as a result of his accident at Brown & Root in 1987, which
injury was then aggravated by Mr. Wardrop's fall on the ice in
1992.
Based on the foregoing facts, the ALJ concluded that Brown &
Root was liable for the anticipated arthroscopic surgery on Mr.
Wardrop's right knee, as well as temporary total disability
benefits during the time required for healing.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Brown & Root's Motion For Review contends that the ALJ erred
in:
1) concluding that Mr. Wardrop's current knee injury was
caused by the 1987 industrial accident; 2) declining to refer the
matter to a medical panel; 3) limiting Brown & Root's inquiry into
Mr. Wardrop's criminal record; and 4) concluding that a three year
statute of limitations adopted in 1988 is inapplicable to this 1987
accident. Each of Root & Brown's contentions is discussed below.
No one disputes Mr. Waldrop's need for surgery to correct the
damaged anterior cruciate ligament of his right knee. The only
dispute is whether Mr. Waldrop's knee injury is the result of his
1987 industrial accident and therefore compensable under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act.
Having reviewed the record, the Commission finds the various
medical opinions to be in substantial agreement that Mr. Waldrop'js
industrial injury of 1987 is the genesis of his current problem.
The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's conclusion that Mr.Waldrop is entitled to''payment %of medical expenses necessary ro
treat his current knee problem, as well as associated temporary
disability compensation.
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Brown & Root also argues the ALJ should have referred the
medical aspects of this case to a medical panel. The Commission's
Rule R568-1-9.A. governs the use of medical panels;
A panel will be utilized . . ..where:
1) One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports. . . .
As previously noted, the various medical opinions in this case
are in substantial agreement and do not present any significant
medical issue.
The Commission therefore affirms the ALJ's
conclusion that a medical panel is not warranted.
Next, Brown & Root contends the ALJ improperly limited its
questioning of Mr. Wardrop on the subject of his criminal record.
Under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, such examination is
permitted only if the crime in question was of serious magnitude or
involves dishonesty or false statement. From the record provided
to it, the Commission cannot conclude that Mr. Wardrop's alleged
criminal record meets this test of admissibility. Furthermore,
such evidence would be of limited probative value given the
objective facts of this case. The Commission therefore affirms the
ALJ's decision on this point.
Finally, Brown & Root argues the ALJ erred in rejecting its
statute of limitations defense. In particular, Brown & Root points
to Section 35-1-98(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act, which
provides:
. . . an employee's medical benefit entitlement ceases if
the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably
related to the industrial accident, and submit those
expenses to his employer or insurance carrier for
payment, for a period of three consecutive years.
As noted by the ALJ, had this provision been in effect at the
time of Mr. Wardrop's 1987 accident, it might well bar him from
pursuing his claim, since more than three years has elapsed since
he last submitted medical expenses to Brown & Root. However, as
also noted by the ALJ, it is well settled that the law in effect at
the time of the accident governs the substantive rights of the
parties in a workers' compensation claim. Kennecott v. Industrial
Comm. , 740 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah App 1987) Applying the principle of
Kennecott to this case, Mr. Wardrop's claim is not subject to the
three year statute of limitations added to the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act in 1988.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Commission affirms the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge and dismisses Brown & Root's Motion
For Review. It is so ordered.
Dated this

M

day of September, 1994.

^LvQ^x,.
S t e p h e n M. Had]^ey
Chaiito&n

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

£4*3Colleeif
S. Colton
Commissioner

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of
Appeals within 3 0 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on September ~! 6 , 1994, a copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of David
Wardrop v. Brown & Root Industrial Service and Highland Insurance,
Case No. 93-0561, was mailed postage prepaid, first class, to the
following:
DAVID WARDROP
406 COLONIAL
LAYTON, UTAH 84041
G. SCOTT JENSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
205 26TH STREET, #34
OGDEN, UTAH 84401
STUART POELMAN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P. O. BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84145
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
BLACK, NICHOLS AND GUIVER
C/O JAMES BLACK
P. O. BOX 2615
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2615
/"

Diane Kearns \_
Secretary to General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
AH\93-05610
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EXHIBIT E:
BROWN & ROOT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 93-561

DAVID WARDROP,
Applicant,

DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW

BROWN & ROOT INDUSTRIAL
SERVICE/HIGHLANDS INSURANCE
(Black, Nichols & Guiver,
Adjustor),
Defendants.

Pursuant to the provisions of §35-1-82.53 of the Utah Code,
defendants move the Commission for its review of Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order herein dated March 17, 1994,
as follows:
FACTS
The basic facts describing this proceeding and the evidence
presented is substantially outlined in the Findings of Fact
issued by the Administrative Law Judge herein and, thus, will not
be restated here.

The proper application of the facts as

contained in the record will be referenced in the argument set
forth below.
ARGUMENT
The industrial accident which occurred on April 23, 1987,
while the applicant was working for Brown & Root, simply
consisted of his slipping back into a hole out of which the
applicant was climbing and allegedly feeling some pain in his

n

A

right knee. As shown by the medical records, he did not "seelc'
treatment for his knee until some 11 days later when t$ifcf^y4,
1987, he went to the Tanner Clinic.
and he was returned to work.

There his knee wak Grayed,

Then some three-plus weeks

thereafter, he went on his own to see Dr. Bean who recommended
arthroscopic examination in order to determine the extent of
injury.

Inspection of ligaments and the lateral and medial

meniscus was performed by arthroscopic examination by Dr. Sabbert
on July 14, 1987. He found the ligaments intact and no tears in
either the lateral or medial meniscus.

No pathology was found.

Followup reports of Dr. Gabbert reported normal walking, no
swelling nor ligamentous instability, full range of motion and
good quad function, and no anticipated permanent impairment.
Although the applicant did consult with Dr. Janeway in October
1987, and March 1988, it is not known that Dr. Janeway was
provided with the prior records of Dr. Gabbert in order to
confirm or dispute Dr. Gabbertfs findings.

In any event, the

applicant did, over the next several years, work for different
employers in jobs requiring the active use of his right knee, and
he did so without the need for any additional medical treatment
nor any reported impairment with respect to his work activity or
other lifefs activities.
D-3].)

(See Affidavit of Darin Carei [Exhibit

Thus, the evidence presented requires one to conclude

that the industrial accident of April 23, 1987, was not severe,
was adequately treated and that no pathology resulted as was
2
~ r\ *A/C^

determined by a visual inspection of the knee made* pursuant to
arthroscopic examination.
It was not until after the applicant sustained a*3
nonindustrial injury to his right knee on January 27, 1992, that
additional treatment and surgery on the knee was

prescribed.

On

that date, while stepping out of his car upon a sloping, icecovered cement driveway, the applicant's foot slipped out from
under him causing the leg to extend out from underneath hi& and
causing him to fall to the ground-

There is no question but what

said accident was severe in its trauma and that it caused
substantial injury to the knee.

The applicant testified that at

the time of said accident, he felt a popping and experienced
severe pain in the knee.

He further testified that substantial

swelling ensued which required him to pack his knee with ice for
a period of about ten hours.

Thus, both the accident and the

injury which occurred on 1/27/92 can, based upon the evidence
presented, only be found to be both substantial and independent
of the applicant's prior knee injury which had occurred almost
five years before.

It is submitted that there is no substantial

evidence in the record from which one can conclude that the
applicant's foot slipped out from under him on the icy driveway
because of any weakness attributable to the prior industrial
accident.

The applicant's foot slipped on the ice because of the

ice—not because of any weakness in the knee. The applicant has
produced no substantial evidence to prove otherwise. He
3

certainly has not produced a preponderance of evidence"#onn that
fact, which is his burden.

•;• # \

Defendants have no quarrel with the principle citkd'tfy the
Administrative Law Judge in citing Larson. Note, however, that
Larson finds compensable "every natural consequence that flows
from the injury..,"

It can hardly be said that the applicant's

slipping and falling on an icy cement driveway was the "natural
consequence" of his prior industrial injury.

It is also

instructive that Larson indicates that the triggering occurrence
may be found to be compensable "so long as it is clear that the
real operative factor is the progression of the compensable
injury."

In this case, it is far from "clear" that the injury

which the applicant sustained in January 1992, is "the
progression of the compensable injury."
It would appear that the Administrative Law Judge has become
distracted in her analysis of the facts of this case as it
relates to the law cited by Larson.

In the instant case, it is

irrelevant as to whether or not the applicant's slipping on the
ice in January 1992, was a negligent or intentional act since the
relevant focus should not be upon the nature of the act but
rather the cause of the occurrence.

In this case, there is no

substantial evidence that the applicant's slipping on the ice was
in any way caused by industrial injury which occurred in 1987^
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred
in failing to refer this matter to a medical panel for a
4

determination of the medical issues. Since the arthrb^ctfpic#*
examination of the applicant's knee in 1987 revealed *>o###
pathology," then it cannot be assumed that any pathology*Existed.
The mere fact that Dr. Zeluff, who examined applicant in 1993,
speculated that there was a "strong possibility" that there was a
partial tear of the anterior cruciate ligament in May 1987, does
not satisfy the applicant's burden of proof to the effect that
there was. The preponderance of the evidence is that there was
no pathology to the applicant's anterior cruciate ligament as
determined by the visual inspection of Dr. Gabbert in 1987. Any
opinion to the contrary is, in fact, speculative.

It is

certainly beyond the expertise of the Administrative Law Judge to
resolve that medical question.
It is instructive that the Administrative Law Judge refuses
to make a finding with respect to whether or not the injury of
1992 was an "actual aggravation" of a pre-existing condition
since there is no substantial evidence to support such a finding.
There is, on the other hand, a clear demonstration by the
evidence that the 1992 accident caused a new and different injury
and that this new injury is what creates the need for the
prescribed surgery.
The primary object of the application in this proceeding is
to require the defendants to pay for the prescribed surgery.

The

evidence taken as a whole does not preponderate in favor of a
finding that the surgery is necessitated because of an industrial
5

• • •
•

accident in 1987,

«
•

«
• •

« ' - - ^

On the other hand, it strongly preponderates

in favor of a finding that applicant's accident in Jaijnayry 1992,
was the event that requires the prospective surgery, •lTh#a#
prospective surgery is for the purpose of repairing a torn
anterior cruciate ligament and a torn medial meniscus. None of
that pathology can be demonstrated to have occurred as a result
of the 1987 industrial accident.
the 1992 accident.

It was clearly the result of

There is no definitive evidence that the

prescribed surgery would have been necessary had it not been for
the 1992 accident.
It is submitted that the Administrative Law Judge also erred
in refusing to allow the defendants to pursue inquiry at the
hearing concerning the applicant's criminal record.

To the

extent that the Administrative Law Judge relied upon the
testimony of the applicant, then his credibility is at issue and
his criminal record is a relevant matter for consideration in
that regard.

During the course of the hearing, the defendants

demonstrated that the applicant had been twice convicted of a
crime; but the applicants objection to further examination on
his further criminal record was sustained, and the defendants
were precluded from making a record on his criminal background.
It is also submitted that the Administrative Law Judge erred
in ruling that the three-year statute of limitations relating to
medical care does not bar the applicant's claim for additional
medical expenses.

Since the thrfee-year statute of limitations
6

••

••

became effective on July 1, 1988, and the applicant drd not incur*
and submit for payment any further medical expenses for a period
•

• •

of at least three years thereafter, the limitation wqijjcf.apply to
the instant case if it is determined that the statute is
procedural in nature.

If so, it is applicable to all industrial

accidents whether those accidents occurred before or after the
enactment of the statute unless some prejudice can be
demonstrated.

The Supreme Court has ruled that statutes af

limitations are procedural in nature and, therefore, can be
applied retroactively.

Certainly, in this case, the applicant

should be treated no differently because his industrial accident
occurred in 1987 as opposed to someone whose industrial accident
occurred after July 1, 1988.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, it is submitted that the
Order requiring the defendants to pay for the applicant's
prescribed surgery is in error, is not based upon a preponderance
of evidence, and should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
\^
day of April, 1994.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MftRTINEAU

-B2L

C u ^ y v \ /JJkXu,
Stuart L. Poelman
Attorneys for Defendants
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
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ss.

Gloriann Egan being duly sworn, says that she is employed by
the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for
defendants Brown & Root and Highlands Insurance herein; that she
served the attached DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR REVIEW (Case Number
93-561, Utah State Industrial Commission) upon the parties listed
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
G. Scott Jensen, Esq.
205 26th Street #34
Ogden, Utah 84401
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on

the / 3

day of April, 1994.

Gloriann Egan
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/3^day of April,

1994.
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My Commission Expires:

ing in the State of Utah
k^AiVKlBlI^
Cynthia
Morthttrom
10 £ * * « * • * « » , 11th Rr;
M t U i o t City, Utah S4111
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